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# Security and Open Source Software (OSS/FLOSS)

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*This presentation contains the views of the author and does not indicate endorsement by IDA, the U.S. government, or the U.S. Department of Defense.*

- **Key terms: Assurance**
- **Misc. Issues**
  - **OSS/FLOSS is commercial**
  - **Executable specifications**
- **Typical OSS Development Model**
- **Security: Extreme claims on OSS**
- **Unintentional vulnerabilities**
  - **Statistics on security & reliability**
  - **Open design: A security fundamental**
  - **OSS security preconditions (unintentional)**
  - **Proprietary advantages... not necessarily**
- **Intentional/malicious vulnerabilities**

- **“System assurance is the justified confidence that the system functions as intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system at any time during the life cycle.”**
    - This ideal of no exploitable vulnerabilities is usually unachievable in practice, so programs must perform risk management to reduce the probability and impact of vulnerabilities to acceptable levels
    - For software, replace “system” with “software”
- [“Engineering for System Assurance”, NDIA & NATO]**

## **Definition: Free-Libre / Open Source Software (FLOSS/OSS)**

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- **Free-Libre / Open Source Software (FLOSS or OSS) programs have licenses giving users the freedom:**
  - to run the program for any purpose,
  - to study and modify the program, and
  - to freely redistribute copies of either the original or modified program (without royalties, etc.)
- ***Not* non-commercial, *not* necessarily no-charge**
  - Often supported via commercial companies
- **Synonyms: Libre software, FLOS, OSS/FS**
- **Antonyms: proprietary software, closed software**


- **U.S. Law (41 USC 403), FAR, & DFARS: OSS is commercial!**
  - Commercial item is “(1) Any item, other than real property, that is of a type customarily used by the general public or by non-governmental entities for purposes [not government-unique], and (i) Has been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public; or (ii) Has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public... (3) [Above with] (i) Modifications of a type customarily available in the commercial marketplace; or (ii) Minor modifications... made to meet Federal Government requirements...”
  - Intentionally broad; "enables the Government to take greater advantage of the commercial marketplace" [DoD AT&L]
- **Confirmed by DoD “Clarifying Guidance Regarding OSS” (2009) and Navy “OSS Guidance” (June 5, 2007)**
- **17 USC 101: OSS projects’ improvements = financial gain**
  - 17 USC 101: “financial gain” inc. “receipt, or expectation of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works.”
- **OMB Memo M-03-14 (Commercial software): OSS support**
- **Important: U.S. Law (41 USC 403), FAR, DFARS require U.S. gov’t contracts prefer commercial items (inc. COTS) & NDI:**
  - Agencies must “(a) Conduct market research to determine [if] commercial items or NDI are available ... (b) Acquire [them] when... available ... (c) Require prime contractors and subcontractors at all tiers to incorporate, to the maximum extent practicable, [them] as components...”

## OSS is clearly commercial by other measures too

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- Many OSS projects supported by commercial companies
  - IBM, Sun, Red Hat (solely OSS, market cap \$4.3B), Novell, Microsoft (WiX, IronPython, SFU, Codeplex site)
- Big money in OSS companies
  - Citrix bought XenSource (\$500 million), Sun bought MySQL (\$1 billion), Red Hat bought JBoss (\$350 million; *OSS buys OSS*)
  - IBM reports invested \$1B in 2001, made it back in 2002
  - Venture capital invested \$1.44B in OSS 2001-2006 [InfoWorld]
- Paid developers
  - Linux: 37K/38K changes in 2004; Apache, X Window system
- OSS licenses/projects approve of commercial support
- Sell service/hw, commoditize complements, avoid costs
- Users use COTS/NDI because they share costs – OSS does!
- Even GPL'ed software is commercial

# IDA Typical OSS development model



- OSS users typically use software without paying licensing fees
- OSS users typically pay for training & support (competed)
- OSS users are responsible for paying/developing new improvements & any evaluations that they need; often cooperate with others to do so
- Goal: Active development community (like a consortium)

- **Standards & other specs are documents**
  - Not useful by *themselves* – sit on shelf
  - They have to be *implemented*
  - Often have omissions, interpretation issues, etc.
- **Proprietary software**
  - Useful by itself
  - Often opaque interfaces (APIs, data formats) & meaning
  - Inability to replace can lead to lock-in
- **OSS can serve as “executable specification”**
  - Useful by itself *and* can see interfaces & meaning
  - E.G., Apache (HTTP), BSD (TCP/IP), Firefox (HTML)
  - Provides protection from supplier bankruptcy, unreliability, strategy change, etc.



- **Extreme claims**
  - “OSS is always more secure”
  - “Proprietary is always more secure”
- **Reality: Neither OSS nor proprietary always better**
  - Some *specific* OSS programs *are* more secure than their competing proprietary competitors
- **Include OSS options when acquiring, then evaluate**



- **Browser “unsafe” days in 2004: 98% Internet Explorer, 15% Mozilla/Firefox (half of Firefox’s MacOS-only)**
- **IE 21x more likely to get spyware than Firefox [U of Wash.]**
- **Faster response: Firefox 37 days, Windows 134.5 days**
- **Evans Data: Linux rarely broken, ~virus/Trojan-free**
- **Serious vulnerabilities: Apache 0, IIS 8 / 3yrs**
- **J.S. Wurzler hacker insurance costs 5-15% more for Windows than for Unix or Linux**
- **Bugtraq vulnerability 99-00: Smallest is OpenBSD, Windows largest (Don't quintuple-count!)**
- **Windows websites more vulnerable in practice**

Category	Proprietary	OSS
Defaced	66% (Windows)	17% (GNU/Linux)
Deployed Systems	49.6% (Windows)	29.6% (GNU/Linux)
Deployed websites (by name)	24.81% (IIS)	66.75% (Apache)

- **Unpatched networked systems: 3 months Linux, hours Windows (variance minutes ... months)[Honey.net.org, Dec 2004]**
  - **Windows SP2 believed to be better than previous versions of Windows**
- **50% Windows vulnerabilities are critical, vs. 10% in Red Hat [Nicholas Petreley, Oct 2004]**
- **Viruses primarily Windows phenomenon**
  - **60,000 Windows, 40 Macintosh, 5 for commercial Unix versions, 40 for Linux**
- **91% broadband users have spyware on their home computers (proprietary OS) [National Cyber Security Alliance, May 2003] vs. ~0% on OSS**

- **OSS systems scored better on security [Payne, Information Systems Journal 2002]**
- **Survey of 6,344 software development managers April 2005 favored OSS [BZ Research]**

- Fuzz studies found OSS apps significantly more reliable [U Wisconsin]
  - Proprietary Unix failure rate: 28%, 23%
  - OSS: Slackware Linux 9%, GNU utilities 6%
  - Windows: 100%; 45% if forbid certain Win32 message formats
- GNU/Linux vs. Windows NT 10 mo study [ZDNet]
  - NT crashed every 6 weeks; both GNU/Linuxes, never
- IIS web servers >2x downtime of Apache [Syscontrol AG]
- Linux kernel TCP/IP had smaller defect density [Reasoning]



■ Proprietary Average (0.55, 0.41)

■ Linux kernel (0.10, 0.013)

- **No: Sendmail, bind 4**
- **Must examine case-by-case**
  - **But there *is* a principle that gives OSS a *potential* advantage...**

- **Saltzer & Schroeder [1974/1975] - Open design principle**
  - the protection mechanism must not depend on attacker ignorance
- **OSS better fulfills this principle**
- **Security experts perceive OSS advantage**
  - Bruce Schneier: “demand OSS for anything related to security”
  - Vincent Rijmen (AES): “forces people to write more clear code & adhere to standards”
  - Whitfield Diffie: “it’s simply unrealistic to depend on secrecy for security”

- **Hiding source doesn't halt attacks**
  - Presumes you can keep source secret
    - Attackers may extract or legitimately get it
  - Dynamic attacks don't need source or binary
    - Observing output from inputs sufficient for attack
  - Static attacks can use pattern-matches against binaries
  - Source can be regenerated by disassemblers & decompilers sufficiently to search for vulnerabilities
  - Secrecy inhibits helpers, while not preventing attackers
  - “Security by Obscurity” widely denigrated
- **Hiding source slows vulnerability response**
- **Vulnerability secrecy doesn't halt attacks**
  - Vulnerabilities are a time bomb and are likely to be rediscovered by attackers
  - Brief secrecy works (10-30 days), not months/years



## Can “Security by Obscurity” be a basis for security?

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- “Security by Obscurity” can work, but if & only if:
  - Keeping secret actually improves security
  - You can keep the critical information a secret
- For obscurity itself to give significant security:
  - Keep source secret from all but a few people. Never sell or reveal source to many. E.G.: Classify
  - Keep binary secret; never sell binary to outsiders
    - Use software protection mechanisms (goo, etc.)
    - Remove software binary before exporting system
  - Do not allow inputs/outputs of program to be accessible by others – *no* Internet/web access
- Useless in most cases!
  - Incompatible with off-the-shelf model
- Proprietary software *can* be secure – but not this way <sup>17</sup>

- **Most major OSS projects have specific code reviews; some have rewards**
  - **Mozilla Security Bug Bounty Program**
  - **Linux: hierarchical review, “sparse” tool**
- **Disseminated review groups (second check):**
  - **OpenBSD (for OpenBSD)**
  - **Debian-audit (for Debian Linux)**
- **Static analysis tool vendors test using OSS**
  - **Vulnerability Discovery and Remediation, Open Source Hardening Project (DHS/Coverity/Stanford)**
  - **Fortify’s “Java Open Review Project”**
- **Many independents (see Bugtraq, etc.)**
- **Users' increased transparency -> examination & feedback**

- 1. Developers/reviewers need security knowledge**
  - Knowledge more important than licensing
- 2. People have to actually *review* the code**
  - Reduced likelihood if niche/rarely-used, few developers, rare computer language, not really OSS
  - More contributors, more review
    - Is it *truly* community-developed?
  - Evidence suggests this really happens!
- 3. Problems must be fixed**
  - Far better to fix *before* deployment
  - If already deployed, need to deploy fix

- **First, identify your security requirements**
- **Look for evidence at OSS project website**
  - **User's/Admin Guides: discuss make/keep it secure?**
  - **Process for reporting security vulnerabilities?**
  - **Cryptographic signatures for current release?**
  - **Developer mailing lists discuss security issues and work to keep the program secure?**
  - **Active community**
- **Use other information sources where available**
  - **E.G., CVE... but absence is not necessarily good**
  - **External reputation (e.g., OpenBSD)**
- **See [http://www.dwheeler.com/oss\\_fs\\_eval.html](http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_eval.html)**

- Experienced developers who understand security produce better results
  - Experience & knowledge *are critical*, but...
  - OSS developers often very experienced & knowledgeable too (BCG study: average 11yrs experience, 30 yrs old) – often same people
- Proprietary developers higher quality?
  - Dubious; OSS often higher reliability, security
  - Market rush often impairs proprietary quality
- No guarantee OSS is widely reviewed
  - True! Unreviewed OSS may be very insecure
  - Also true for proprietary (rarely reviewed!). *Check it!*
- Can sue vendor if insecure/inadequate
  - Nonsense. EULAs forbid, courts rarely accept, costly to sue with improbable results, you want sw not a suit

- **“Anyone can modify OSS, including attackers”**
  - Actually, you can modify proprietary programs too... just use a hex editor. Legal niceties not protection!
  - Trick is to get result into user supply chain
  - In OSS, requires subverting/misleading the trusted developers or trusted repository/distribution...
  - *and* no one noticing the public malsource later
- **Different threat types: Individual...nation-state**
- **Distributed source aids detection**
- **Large community-based OSS projects tend to have many reviewers from many countries**
  - Makes attacks more difficult
  - Consider supplier as you would proprietary software
  - Risk larger for small OSS projects

## **Malicious attack approaches: OSS vs. proprietary**

- **Repository/distribution system attack**
  - **Traditional proprietary advantage: can more easily disconnect repository from Internet, not shared between different groups**
    - **But development going global, so disconnect less practical**
  - **Proprietary advantage: distribution control**
  - **OSS advantage: Easier detection & recovery via many copies**
- **Malicious trusted developers**
  - **OSS slight advantage via review, but weak (“fix” worse!)**
  - **OSS slight advantage: More likely to know who developers are**
  - **Reality: For both, *check who is developing it!***
- **Malicious untrusted developer**
  - **Proprietary advantage: Fewer untrusted developers**
    - **Sub-suppliers, “Trusted” developers may be malicious**
  - **OSS long-term advantages: Multiple reviewers (more better)**
- **Unclear winner – No evidence proprietary always better**

- **Linux kernel attack – repository insertion**
  - Tried to hide; = instead of ==
  - Attack failed (CM, developer review, conventions)
- **Debian/SourceForge repository subversions**
  - Countered & restored by external copy comparisons
- **Often malicious code made to look like unintentional code**
  - Techniques to counter unintentional still apply
  - Attacker could devise to work around tools... but won't know in OSS what tools are used!
- **Borland InterBase/Firebird Back Door**
  - user: politically, password: correct
  - Hidden for 7 years in proprietary product
  - Found after release as OSS in 5 months
  - Unclear if malicious, but has its form



- **Counter Repository/distribution system attack**
  - Widespread copies, comparison process
  - Evidence of hardened repository
  - Digitally signed distribution
- **Counter Malicious trusted developers**
  - Find out who's developing your system (*always!*)
- **Counter Malicious untrusted developer**
  - Strong review process
    - As with unintentional vulnerabilities: Security-knowledgeable developers, review, fix what's found
  - Update process, for when vulnerabilities found

- **Neither OSS nor proprietary always better**
  - But clearly many cases where OSS *is* better
- **OSS use increasing industry-wide**
  - In some areas, e.g., web servers, it dominates
- **Policies must not ignore or make it difficult to use OSS where applicable**
  - Challenges: radically different assumptions & approach
- **Include OSS options when acquiring, then evaluate**
- **For more on DoD OSS policy, FAQs, etc., see:**
  - <http://cio-nii.defense.gov/sites/oss/>

# IDA

# Backups

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- **Negotiate best options with all parties, *then* select**
  - Good: Israeli government's process
  - Unwise: Media reports of Newham Borough Council's
- **Evaluation criteria**
  - Functionality, cost, market share, support, maintenance/longevity, reliability, performance, scalability, flexibility, legal/license (inc. *rights and responsibilities*), other
- **Warranty & indemnification**
  - Often disclaimed by *both* proprietary & OSS licenses
  - Indemnification exception: Linux (OSDL, HP, RH, Novell)
- **Developer trustworthiness usually unknown**
  - Can review OSS code & sometimes proprietary

- **Process&code openness means more&different sources of evaluation information**
  - Bug databases, mailing list discussions, ...
  - Anyone can review/comment on design
  - Anyone (inc. you) can evaluate source code for security
  - See [http://www.dwheeler.com/oss\\_fs\\_eval.html](http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_eval.html)
- **Proprietary=pay/use, OSS=pay/improvement**
  - In either case pay for installation, training, support
  - In OSS, pay can be time and/or money
- **Support can be competed & changed**
  - OSS vendors, government support contracts, self
- **OSS can be modified & redistributed**
  - New option, but need to know when to modify
  - Forking usually fails; generally work with community

- **Steps for evaluating OSS and proprietary are essentially the same. My process:**
  - *Identify* candidates
  - Read *reviews*
  - *Compare* (briefly) to needs
    - Functionality, cost, market share, support, maintenance, reliability, performance, scalability, useability, security, flexibility, legal/license
  - *Analyze* top candidates in more depth
- **But many differences in the details**
  - Different information available
  - Support can be competed
  - Can be modified, redistributed
  - Outlay costs per improvement, not per seat

1. **Ensuring OSS considered in acquisitions**
  - Acquisition processes developed before OSS rise
  - Many OSS projects don't respond to solicitations&RFPs
2. **Ensuring license compliance**
  - No *use* requirements. Education needed on redistributing copyleft (but easier than proprietary)
3. **CC security evaluations (no funding model)**
  - Government-funded evaluation for free use/support?
  - Multi-Government funding (@enterprise license level)
4. **Support if there's no traditional vendor**
5. **Dependence on proprietary formats/protocols**
  - Use open standards. DoD JTA (DISR) wants: mature, not proprietary, publicly held, multi-vendor commercial support, international>national, don't require patents, ...
  - Government policy issue: software patents justified?

- **Effective OSS systems typically have built a large development community**
  - Share costs/effort for development & review
  - Same reason that proprietary off-the-shelf works: Multiple customers distribute costs
- **Custom systems can be built from OSS (& proprietary) components**
- **If no pre-existing system, sometimes can create a generalized custom system**
  - Then *generalized* system/framework OSS, with a custom config/plugin-ins for your problem
  - Do risk/benefit analysis before proceeding



**IDA**

# Appendix: High Assurance

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- “High assurance (HA) software”: has an argument that can convince skeptical parties that the software will *always/never perform* certain key actions *without fail*... convincing evidence of *no relevant software defects*. CC EAL 6+
  - Requires formal methods (FM); testing inadeq.
  - Today, extremely rare. Critical safety/security
- Medium assurance software: not high assurance, but significant effort expended to find and remove important flaws through review, testing, and so on. CC EAL 4-5
  - No proof it's flawless, just effort to find and fix

- **OSS development tends to involve collaborative review**
  - **Consistent with mathematical approaches, also tend to involve collaborative review**
- **Many OSS community leaders have extensive mathematical training**
- **Many HA/FM tools are OSS**
  - **Many OSS developers avoid depending on proprietary tools (“Java Trap”)**


- **Few public FM examples**
  - **Needed for starting points & for training**
    - **OOP: Books of examples. FM: Books on logic**
  - **Details of FM use unpublished, often classified**
  - **Result:**
    - **FM toolmakers receive little feedback to improve**
    - **Most developers don't understand, uncertain value**
    - **No OSS projecting *applying* FM have self-sustaining “critical mass” (to overcome “energy barrier”)**
- **Few FM courses; extant ones often manual**
- **Current OSS FM tools (& many proprietary ones too):**
  - **Hard to install (unpackaged)**
  - **Poorly integrate (packaging, e.g., Why/Zenon)**
  - **Hard to learn to use (inadequate documentation)**
  - **Hard to use (lack of feedback to toolmakers)**

# IDA

## Need: working ecosystem

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
- Toolmakers
  - Can learn *details* from some other researchers
    - Papers alone inadequate [“LINMAT to NANOSAT”]
  - Can learn from developer challenges
  - Can build on/experiment with existing tools
- Developers
  - Learn from/build on previous proven software
- Evaluators & Users
  - Learn from/build on previous proven software



- “Open proof” (new term):
  - Source code, proofs, and required tools: OSS
- Anyone can examine/critique, improve upon, collaborate with others for improvements
  - Not just software, but what’s proved & tools
  - Example for training, or as useful component
- Extends OSS idea for HA
  - Enables legal collaboration
  - Similar to mathematics field
- Goal: Make supplier identity irrelevant
  - Transparency => know it’s okay
- Don’t need *all* HA to be open proofs

- ✓ Identified OSS FM tools, selected most promising
- ✓ Set up draft “open proofs” website
- ✓ Dialogue with some key OSS/security people
- Package “most promising” for easy install in common distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, ...) [IN PROGRESS]
  - Packaged Coq, zfuzz, zenon; miniSAT, Why
  - Convinced others: prover9, PVS
- Improve website (controlled-write Wiki/mailing list)
- Publicize more broadly
- Select small examples & do them (learn) - many
- Identify possible set for HA OSS development & options for starting them
  - Using experience gained from above

# Example: “The Why Stack” (ProVal)





- Caduceus (C)/  
Krakatoa (Java)/ Why!
- Frama-C/Jessie (C)
- Coq!
- PVS\*
- ACL2\*
- HOL4
- Isabelle/HOL
- HOL Lite
- KeY (Java)
- Z fuzz!
- E\*
- Alloy
- BLAST
- Prover9\*
- Zenon!
- Alt-Ergo!
- CVC3\* (License issue)
- MiniSAT2! (submitted)
- Kodkod
- Gandalf
- NuSMV
- DiVinE

!=We've added to Fedora; \*=In process in Fedora

- Many FM tools – focus on different issues
- Researchers often don't make software easy to install
  - No “tech transition” process
- Researchers often don't understand law (no license?!)
- Lawyers write new licenses → uselessness (CVC3)
  - OSS is mostly standardized on a few licenses
    - Legal to include, legal to combine, easily understood
- Much research software not commercialized → disappears
  - Not OSS nor supported proprietary (Z/Eves, ESC/Java)
  - If won't sell as proprietary, release as OSS!
- Developers typically conservative on key tools
  - Demo utility, incremental application critical
- My opinion: U.S. has lost lead in FM
  - U.S. once led (ACL2, PVS, ...); most new tools European
  - French demonstrating viable alternative with OSS
  - U.S. little research \$, CS often omits discrete math

- **If interested in helping on open proofs, let me know!**
  - **<http://www.openproofs.org>**

- High assurance (HA) software:
  - Has an argument that could convince skeptical parties that the software will *always perform or never perform* certain key functions *without fail...* convincing evidence that there are *absolutely no software defects*. CC EAL 6+
  - Significant use of formal methods, high test coverage
  - High cost – requires deep pockets at this time
  - A few OSS & proprietary tools to support HA dev
  - Few proprietary, even fewer OSS HA at this time
- Theoretically OSS should be better for HA
  - In mathematics, proofs are often wrong, so only peer review of proofs valid [De Millo,Lipton,Perlis]. OSS!
- HA developers/customers *very conservative* & results often secret, so rarely apply “new” approaches like OSS... yet

## Many OSS tools support high assurance development

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- **Configuration Management:** CVS, Subversion (SVN), GNU Arch, git/Cogito, Bazaar, Bazaar-NG, Monotone, Mercurial, Darcs, svk, Aegis, CVSNT, FastCST, OpenCM, Vesta, Supersversion, Arx, Codeville...
- **Testing:** [opensourcetesting.org](http://opensourcetesting.org) lists 275 tools Apr 2006, inc. Bugzilla (tracking), DejaGnu (framework), gcov (coverage), ...
- **Formal methods:** Community Z tools (CZT) , ZETA, ProofPower, Overture, ACL2, Coq, E, Otter/MACE, PTPP, Isabelle, HOL4, HOL Light, Gandalf, Maude Sufficient Completeness Checker, KeY, RODIN, Hybrid Logics Model Checker, Spin, NuSMV 2, BLAST, Java PathFinder, SATABS, DiVinE, Splint (as LCLint), ...
- **Analysis implementation:** Common LISP (GNU Common LISP (GCL), CMUCL, GNU CLISP), Scheme, Prolog (GNU Prolog, SWI-Prolog, Ciao Prolog, YAP), Maude, Standard ML, Haskell (GHC, Hugs), ...
- **Code implementation:** C (gcc), Ada (gcc GNAT), ...
  - **Java/C#:** OSS implementations (gcj/Mono) maturing; gc issue

- **Many high assurance projects must meet measurable requirements on their tests.**  
**Common measures:**
  - **Statement (line) coverage: % program statements exercised by at least one test.**
  - **Branch coverage: % of “branches” from decision points (if/then/else, switch/case, ?:) exercised by at least one test**
  - **Some argue unit testing (low-level tests) should achieve 100% in both; most say 80%-90% okay**
  - **Many other measures**
- **OSS tools available (e.g., gcov)**

- **Formal methods: application of rigorous mathematical techniques to software development**
- **Three levels (& often focused application):**
  - **0: Formal specification (using mathematics)**
  - **1: Go deeper, e.g., (a) refine specification to a mathematically-defined design or more detailed model, and/or (b) prove important properties of the specification and/or model**
  - **2: Fully prove that the code matches the design specification. Very expensive, if done at all, often done with only the most critical portions**
- **Tool types: Specification handling, theorem provers, model checkers, ...**

- Configuration Management: CVS, Subversion (SVN), GNU Arch, git/Cogito, Bazaar, Bazaar-NG, Monotone, Mercurial, Darcs, svk, Aegis, CVSNT, FastCST, OpenCM, Vesta, Supersversion, Arx, Codeville...
- Testing: opensourcetesting.org lists 275 tools Apr 2006, inc. Bugzilla (tracking), DejaGnu (framework), gcov (coverage), ...
- Formal methods: Community Z tools (CZT), ZETA, ProofPower, Overture, ACL2, Coq, E, Otter/MACE, PTPP, Isabelle, HOL4, HOL Light, Gandalf, Maude Sufficient Completeness Checker, KeY, RODIN, Hybrid Logics Model Checker, Spin, NuSMV 2, BLAST, Java PathFinder, SATABS, DiVinE, Splint (as LCLint), ...
- Analysis implementation: Common LISP (CMUCL, Steel Bank CL), Scheme, Prolog (GNU Prolog, SWI-Prolog, Ciao Prolog, YAP), Maude, Standard ML, Haskell (GHC), ...
- Code implementation: C/C++/Ada (gcc/GNAT), Java, ...



- **Z: ISO/IEC 13568:2002**
  - Community Z tools (CZT) project, ZETA, ProofPower
- **VDM**
  - Overture
- **B**
  - RODIN Project
- **UML Object Constraint Language**
  - KeY

- **ACL2**
  - Industrial-strength theorem prover using LISP notation, Boyer-Moore family (ACM Software System Award)
  - Used for processor designs, microcode, machine code, Java bytecode, ... found 3 defects in BSD C string library
- **Otter**
  - High-performance general-purpose (math) prover
- **Isabelle, HOL 4**
  - Theorem prover, “drive” via ML
- **Spin**
  - Model-checking to verify distributed software systems. Used for Netherlands flood control barrier, Deep Space 1, Cassini, Mars Exploration Rovers, Deep Impact. ACM Software System Award

- **Closest: GNAT Pro High-Integrity Edition (HIE), EROS, few library routines**
- **OSS strong in medium assurance**
- **Why few high assurance?**
  - **Too expensive to do using OSS? Unlikely, if there's an economic incentive**
  - **No possibility of a rational economic model? Unlikely; components exist where cost avoidance sensible**
  - **Expertise too specialized? Probably partly true**
  - **Few considered the possibility? Yes; many potential customers/users have failed to consider an OSS option at all (e.g., consortium)**

- **Many OSS tools available for creating high assurance components**
- **Few OSS high assurance components**
  - **Decision-makers failing to consider FLOSS-based approaches... they *should* consider them, so can choose when appropriate**
- **Government-funded software development in academia should normally be released under a OSS license**
  - **Many tools lost forever if not released as OSS**
  - **Build on it vs. start over. GPL-compatible**
- **OSS developers should consider developing or improving high-assurance components or tools**

- **Common Criteria (CC) can be used on OSS**
  - Red Hat Linux, Novell/SuSE Linux, OpenSSL
- **CC matches OSS imperfectly**
  - CC developed before rise of OSS
  - Doesn't credit mass peer review or detailed code review
  - Requires mass creation of documentation not normally used in OSS development
- **Government policies discriminate against OSS**
  - Presume that vendor will pay hundreds of thousands or millions for a CC evaluation (“big company” funding)
    - Presumes nearly all small business & OSS insecure
  - Presume that “without CC evaluation, it's not secure”
  - Need to fix policies to meet real goal: secure software
    - Government-funded evaluation for free use/support?
    - Multi-Government funding?
    - Alternative evaluation processes?

- Formal methods applicable to OSS & proprietary
- Difference: OSS allows public peer review
  - In mathematics, peer review often finds problems in proofs; many publicly-published proofs are later invalidated
  - Expect true for software-related proofs, even with proof-checkers (invalid models/translation, invalid assumptions/proof methods)
  - Proprietary sw generally forbids public peer review
- Formal methods challenges same
  - Few understand formal methods (*anywhere*)
  - Scaling up to “real” systems difficult
  - Costs of applying formal methods—who pays?
    - *May* be even harder for OSS
    - Not easy for proprietary either

- **“One unexpected result was the degree to which Security depends on FOSS. Banning FOSS would remove certain types of infrastructure components (e.g., OpenBSD) that currently help support network security. It would also limit DoD access to—and overall expertise in—the use of powerful FOSS analysis and detection applications that hostile groups could use to help stage cyberattacks. Finally, it would remove the demonstrated ability of FOSS applications to be updated rapidly in response to new types of cyberattack. Taken together, these factors imply that banning FOSS would have immediate, broad, and strongly negative impacts on the ability of many sensitive and security-focused DoD groups to defend against cyberattacks.”**
- **“Use of Free and Open Source Software in the US Dept. of Defense” (MITRE, sponsored by DISA), Jan. 2, 2003, <http://www.egovos.org/>**

- **COTS: Commercial Off-the-Shelf (either proprietary or OSS)**
- **DoD: Department of Defense**
- **HP: Hewlett-Packard Corporation**
- **JTA: Joint Technical Architecture (list of standards for the DoD); being renamed to DISR**
- **OSDL: Open Source Development Labs**
- **OSS: Open Source Software**
- **RFP: Request for Proposal**
- **RH: Red Hat, Inc.**
- **U.S.: United States**

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- **“Why OSS/FS? Look at the Numbers!”**  
[http://www.dwheeler.com/oss\\_fs\\_why.html](http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_why.html)
- **“Use of Free and Open Source Software in the US Dept. of Defense” (MITRE, sponsored by DISA)**
- **President's Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC) -- Panel on Open Source Software for High End Computing, October 2000**
- **“Open Source Software (OSS) in the DoD,” DoD memo signed by John P. Stenbit (DoD CIO), May 28, 2003**
- **Center of Open Source and Government (EgovOS)**  
<http://www.egovos.org/>
- **OpenSector.org** <http://opensector.org>
- **Open Source and Industry Alliance** <http://www.osaia.org>
- **Open Source Initiative** <http://www.opensource.org>
- **Free Software Foundation** <http://www.fsf.org>
- **OSS/FS References**  
[http://www.dwheeler.com/oss\\_fs\\_refs.html](http://www.dwheeler.com/oss_fs_refs.html)